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In this paper, I dwell on a particular distinction introduced by Ilhan 
Inan—the distinction between ostensible and inostensible use of our lan-
guage. The distinction applies to singular terms, such as proper names 
and defi nite descriptions, or to general terms like concepts and to the 
ways in which we refer to objects in the world by using such terms. Inan 
introduces the distinction primarily as an epistemic one but in his ear-
lier writings (1997: 49) he leaves some room for it to have some seman-
tic signifi cance i.e., the view that in certain intensional de re contexts 
whether a term occurring in a sentence is ostensible or inostensible may 
have a bearing on the semantic content of the sentence. However, in his 
later writings e.g., The Philosophy of Curiosity, he appears to abandon 
his earlier thoughts regarding the semantic signifi cance of his distinc-
tion. He says: “the ostensible/inostensible distinction is basically an 
epistemic one.... It is an epistemic distinction that has no semantic 
signifi cance” (2012: 65). I argue that there are indeed such intensional 
contexts in which the distinction has some semantic signifi cance, i.e., 
whether a term is ostensible or inostensible has in fact a bearing on what 
proposition is expressed by the sentence in which the term occurs.
Keywords: Inostensible reference, semantic signifi cance, reference 
fi xing.
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1. Introduction
One of the striking features of our language is that we are able to talk 
about objects we have not known or experienced yet. For Inan, what 
allows us to acquire the capacity of talking about the things that are 
unknown to us is that our language has a distinct tool as a peculiar 
use, namely the tool of inostensibility. The distinction between osten-
sible and inostensible is introduced in terms of the epistemic distance 
between a speaker and an object which is the referent of the term used 
by the speaker. Many terms in our idiolects that we use to refer to 
objects are ostensible for us. For instance, the terms, by virtue of their 
referents, such as “Hisarüstü” or “the location of my former residence” 
are to some extent ostensible for me since I have a sort of knowledge 
of the referents of such terms mostly from ‘immediate acquaintance’ 
or experience and they are inostensible for someone else who does not 
have such knowledge. Terms like “Barack Obama” or “the president of 
United States in 2016” are ostensible presumably for most people who 
are interested in global politics. On the other hand, terms like “the 
president of United States in 2025” is inostensible for everybody since 
nobody knows who will be the president of United States in 2025. In 
this descriptive sense, Inan’s distinction has Russillian roots.1 As Inan 
pointed out (2012: 67), Russell had already the conceptual elements 
that could have helped him to construct a theory of inostensibility and 
thereby, a theory of ignorance and curiosity, but he did not develop 
such theory based on ignorance. Russell was far more knowledge-ori-
ented at the time than ignorance-oriented as Inan now is.
Besides ordinary singular and general terms, the distinction has far-
ranged applications on different kinds of terms such as empty names, 
indefi nite descriptions and non-extensional general terms. Generally 
speaking, due to the object-independent character of the distinction, 
for instance, an empty name can well be inostensible for a speaker if 
the speaker does not know that it does not have a referent. Thus, non-
referring terms, as Inan pointed out (Inan 2012: 164), can be quali-
fi ed as ostensible for a speaker when the speaker knows that it has no 
referent. The inostensibility of a non-referring term depends upon the 
knowledge of the non-existence of the referent of the term. In addition, 
a term which is inostensible for a person at some time t can be osten-
sible for him at some other time t’ or vice versa. I may not know who the 
queen of the Kingdom is but later learn that she is Elizabeth. Likewise, 
I may know Elizabeth as the queen of the Kingdom but later forget 
1 “The basis for inostensible terms are descriptions, and especially defi nite 
descriptions, i.e. terms that have the semantic function of referring to one and only 
one entity.” (Inan 1997: 11). Although Inan’s distinction owes a lot Russell’s famous 
distinction between “knowledge by acquaintance” and “knowledge by description”, 
it considerably diverges from Russell’s theory in that neither all knowledge by 
description is qualifi ed as inostensible nor is all knowledge by acquaintance qualifi ed 
as ostensible. See also (Inan 2012: 67–75).
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that she is the queen or that the queen is her. For these reasons, Inan’s 
distinction is subject-relative, relative to subject’s epistemic condition.
The distinction applies also to the ways in which we refer to objects 
in the world.2 I believe, inostensible reference is of upmost importance 
as the key term in understanding Inan’s conception of inostensibility. 
Inan defi nes inostensible reference as “the reference to an object without 
knowing to which object the term one is using refers.” (2005: 158) The 
key point in understanding inostensibility requires us to understand 
what we mean by knowing an object (a person or a thing). Inan consid-
ers a crucial distinction between knowledge about objects: Knowledge 
of the existence of an object and knowledge of an object itself.3 He ad-
mits (2010: 2) that the notion of ‘knowing the referent of a term’ is 
based upon the latter kind of knowledge, e.g., objectual knowledge. For 
the rest of the paper, I will take into account only this kind of knowl-
edge in characterizing the distinction. There are two reasons for this: 
First, objectual knowledge is what allows for de re exportation (though 
this does not imply that there is no propositional de re knowledge). 
Second, in the reference-fi xing cases that we are going to discuss in 
2 Inostensibility applies to both semantic and speaker’s reference. There are 
certain occasions where the speaker reference is semantically relevant. In his 
book, Inan gives a detailed discussion of the inostensible reference as the necessary 
condition of human curiosity on the one hand and of the semantic/speaker’s reference 
on the other (see Inan 2012: Ch. 7: “Reference to the Object of Curiosity”, especially 
p. 124). For Inan, inostensible reference involving both successful speaker’s 
reference and successful semantic reference is always de re and give rise to singular 
curiosity by the singular de re reference. Where there is no speaker reference, the 
way the speaker refers to an object is said to be taken de dicto. For Kripke, there are 
certain cases where the speaker’s referent is the semantic referent, i.e., where the 
speaker’s general intentions coincide with his specifi c intentions. Kripke says: “In a 
given idiolect, the semantic referent of a designator (without indexicals) is given by a 
general intention of the speaker to refer to a certain object whenever the designator 
is used. The speaker’s referent is given by a specifi c intention, on a given occasion, 
to refer to a certain object. If the speaker believes that the object he wants to talk 
about, on a given occasion, fulfi lls the conditions for being the semantic referent, 
then he believes that there is no clash between his general intentions and his specifi c 
intentions… My hypothesis is that Donnellan’s referential-attributive distinction 
should be generalized in this light… In one case (the “simple” case), his specifi c 
intention is simply to refer to the semantic referent; that is, his specifi c intention 
is simply his general semantic intention... Alternatively—the “complex” case—he 
has a specifi c intention, which is distinct from his general intention, but which he 
believes, as a matter of fact, to determine the same object as the one determined by 
his general intention” (Kripke 1977: 264). In this passage, contrary to Donnellan 
(1966), Kripke argues that “having an object in mind” is not a requirement in order 
for that object to be considered as speaker’s reference. Throughout the paper, I also 
do not count the condition of “having an object in mind” as a condition for speaker’s 
reference.
3 The roots of this distinction between knowledge about objects go back to 
medieval times. Although there is the difference in its peculiar object, it was in 
fact once made by Aquinas in his Summa Theologica (2015) when he discern the 
knowledge of God from that of its existence and presented some arguments for the 
latter while defending the impossibility of the former.
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the next part, it is the kind of knowledge that the reference fi xer lacks, 
which is what makes the term inostensible for the fi xer when she fi xes 
the referent of the term with certain descriptions. 
2. Semantic signifi cance
So far we have seen that Inan introduces the distinction primarily as 
an epistemic one. Now we shall turn to its semantic signifi cance. One of 
the ways to fi nd out whether a given distinction is semantically signifi -
cant is to check out whether it is susceptible or leads to a semantic am-
biguity in certain contexts. There are in fact some intensional de re con-
texts where Inan’s distinction is susceptible to a semantic ambiguity. 
And the task in front us is to provide such contexts in which a sentence 
expresses a false proposition if its semantic content includes an inos-
tensible term and a true proposition if it does not or vice versa. Here 
we apply a general test under a general assumption according to which 
if two propositions have the same content (the same meaning), then it 
cannot be the case that one is false and the other is true in the same con-
text of utterance as well as the same context of evaluation. I argue that 
there are some contexts (intensional), where speaker’s epistemic dis-
tance to an object—a distance determining speaker’s ignorance or his 
knowledge of the object in question—is at least partially4 responsible 
for the alteration in the truth values of certain contingent propositions. 
Thereby, I claim that in these contexts, one’s epistemic condition con-
tributes to the meaning of the sentences whose contents differ in hav-
ing a subject term which picks out a unique object (or a unique kind) to 
which the one is either ostensibly or inostensibly referring.
Let us fi rst focus on Inan’s earlier and later thoughts about what 
semantic implications can be derived from his distinction. The earlier 
thoughts he defends in his dissertation (1997) generally maintains that 
in certain intensional contexts a term’s inostensibility “may have some 
bearing on what proposition is expressed” by the sentence in which the 
term occurs (Inan 1997: 50). In his later thoughts (Inan 2012: 136), on 
the contrary, Inan appears to endorse the view that the transition of 
a term from inostensible to ostensible, e.g., the improvement in one’s 
epistemic condition concerning the knowledge of the referent, has no 
effect on the meaning of a sentence. Contrary to Inan’s later thoughts, 
we have good reason to hold that there are some intensional de re 
contexts where, ceteris paribus, the epistemic distance of the speaker 
to the object which the speaker refers to inostensibly or ostensibly is 
(however partially) responsible for the change in the truth values of 
certain contingent propositions. And these propositions as contents un-
der the scope of an epistemic operator include a subject term picking 
4 Partially, because we need some room for the modal force applied by the 
epistemic operator on the meaning of the given sentence.
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out a unique object (or a unique kind) to which the one is either osten-
sibly or inostensibly referring.
In his doctoral dissertation (Inan 1997), Inan gives a brief discus-
sion for the semantic signifi cance of his distinction. He says “in certain 
intensional contexts such as the sentences with epistemic operators, 
whether a certain term in a sentence is ostensible or inostensible (for 
some or all of the speakers in a community) may have some bearing on 
what proposition is expressed by that sentence” (Inan 1997: 52). How-
ever, he admits that in most cases, what proposition is expressed by 
a simple sentence in the subject-predicate form ‘N is F’ uttered by a 
speaker is independent of whether ‘N’ is ostensible or inostensible for 
the speaker. When the sentence “the smallest prime number is even” 
is uttered by a speaker, we need not know whether the subject term 
‘the smallest prime number’ is ostensible or inostensible for him in or-
der to determine what proposition is expressed by the sentence. The 
cases in which inostensibility of terms may have some bearing on what 
proposition is expressed by the sentence they occur in are in fact very 
special and peculiar cases where a sort of reference-fi xing ceremony 
is required. Hence, I shall restrict the discussion only to those specifi c 
reference-fi xing cases. The detailed discussions for the two reference-
fi xing cases can be seen in both Inan’s earlier (1997) and later works 
(2010), (2012). In the fi rst case, we apply the distinction on the general 
term ‘helium’ by considering the discovery of the element and in the 
second we apply it on the singular term ‘Neptune’ by considering the 
discovery of this planet.
Let us start with the discovery of helium. Inan gives a brief sum-
mary as to how the term ‘helium’ was introduced into our language as 
following:
Pierre Jansen fi rst found a bright yellow line in the spectrum of the light 
emitted by the solar chromosphere, which he thought to be a sodium line. 
Later the chemist Edward Ramsey and the astronomer Joseph Lockyer con-
cluded that the element was not sodium, but some other element that was 
not discovered on earth, and gave it the name “Helios”, the Greek word for 
sun, which later turned into ‘helium’. Only afterward did William Ramsey 
discover the existence of helium on earth. If this is historically accurate, 
then I believe that it should be correct to say that Lockyer and Ramsey 
introduced the general term ‘helium’ not by ostension but rather by fi xing 
its reference by a description....This is how a simple inostensible general 
term may be introduced into language. Later when helium was discovered, 
and we came to know a certain element as being the referent of the term 
‘helium’, the term became ostensible. (Inan 2012: 35)
Let us assume that Ramsey introduced the term ‘helium’ by the de-
scription “the element causing the D-3 line at t”, where the D-3 line is 
the name of some particular yellow colored line that had been observed 
on a light spectrum emitted by the sun at some time t and further, he 
fi xes the reference by that description. Given that introducing of the 
name takes place before the element is discovered on Earth, the name 
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‘helium’ is an inostensible term not only for Ramsey but also for all the 
speakers in the community at t. In other words, because ‘helium’ is in-
troduced by an inostensible description which has the reference-fi xing 
descriptive content for whatever ‘helium’ refers to, the term itself also 
is inostensible for the whole community including Ramsey at t. More-
over, since the reference-fi xing occurs before the discovery, Ramsey 
(like the whole community) is not in a position to fi x the extension of 
the term by ostension. That is another reason why one lacks knowledge 
of the object, namely its objectual knowledge, thus; he must solely rely 
on the initial reference-(extension)-fi xing descriptive content. After the 
discovery, the extension of ‘helium’ could be fi xed by ostension, and 
once that is done, the initial extension-fi xing-description would have no 
longer any signifi cance other than historically (Inan 1997: 49).
Throughout the paper we rely on a general assumption regarding 
the relation between truth value of a sentence and its meaning and that 
is: if two propositions have the same content (the same meaning), then 
it cannot be the case that one is false and the other is true in the same 
context of utterance and that of evaluation. The aim is to show that in a 
certain context, a certain sentence expresses two different propositions 
having different truth values with respect to the inostensibility of terms 
occurring in that sentence. Now consider the following sentence:
(1) It is discoverable that helium did not cause the D-3 line at t.
There is a strong case to be made that if ‘helium’ is an inostensible 
term for both Ramsey and the whole community at t, then (1) has to ex-
press a false proposition.5 As Inan pointed out, “If ‘helium’ named some 
element, it had to be the one causing the D-3 line at t” (1997: 50). But 
after its discovery on Earth, the term turns into an ostensible name for 
Ramsey (and for the whole community) in the sense that now he can fi x 
the reference by ostension; thus (1) will express a true proposition. Af-
ter all, Ramsey like the other members of community can conceive that 
the element that caused the D-3 line at t was not the same element he 
later becomes acquainted with on Earth since after the term becomes 
adequately ostensible for Ramsey (or for the whole community), the con-
tent of reference-fi xing description attached to the name would express 
an accidental property of the designated entity. To put it differently, 
5 In his dissertation, Inan marks out the intensional contexts through the 
sentences with epistemic operators such as “it is discoverable that” and “it is certain 
that. The fi rst operator can also be modifi ed in modal terms such as “it is possible 
to discover that”. But even in the sentences only with modal operators, term’s 
inostensibility may also have a bearing on what proposition is expressed by the 
sentence in which the term occurs. When Ramsey uttered the sentence “It is possible 
that helium did not cause the D-3 line at t.” (*), he would admit that what he uttered 
expresses a false proposition given that the term ‘helium’ is inostensible for him and 
by substituting the term with its reference (extension)-fi xing description, Ramsey 
as the reference-fi xer would arrive at the sentence “It is possible that the element 
causing the D-3 line at t did not cause the D-3 line at t.” towards which his rational 
response would obviously be false when he is asked what he thinks about (*).
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there are some possible worlds where not helium but some other alien 
element causes the D-3 line at t as well as there are many worlds where 
not ‘helium’ but ‘xelium’ refers to the element causing the D-3 line at t. 
So, the sentence (1) expresses a true proposition when the term becomes 
ostensible simply because it is discoverable that helium did not cause 
the D-3 line at t. According to Inan, “… unlike singular terms, when 
fi xing the reference of a general term if we necessarily fi x a content 
to it (such as a Fregean sense) that is not necessarily the content of 
the reference-fi xing description, then it may be argued that the term 
‘helium’ when fi rst introduced (as an inostensible term) differs in con-
tent from the content of the term today (as an ostensible term). This 
would then imply that the discovery of helium changed the meaning 
of the term ‘helium’. This sounds very implausible” (Inan 1997: 52, fn. 
17). But if the reference-fi xing- descriptive content of an expression was 
its meaning, then it would be right to conclude that the discovery of 
helium changed the meaning of the term ‘helium’. There are many rea-
sons for us to argue otherwise, i.e., that the content of the term ‘helium’ 
cannot be identifi ed with the content of the reference-fi xing-description 
nor do we necessarily fi x a content to it and yet the term’s inostensibil-
ity has a bearing on what proposition is expressed.6 The fi rst reason 
comes from the Kripke-Putnam account of natural kind terms accord-
ing to which such terms seem to be deprived of descriptive content and 
their extensions are partly fi xed by external factors. The second reason 
would be that such terms are considered as rigid designators which pick 
out one and the same kind in all possible worlds whereas the reference-
fi xing-description is not a rigid designator and does not individuate an 
essential property for what the term refers to. Thus, the sentence (1) 
expresses a false proposition at t but expresses a true proposition now 
(or after the empirical discovery which let people to fi x the referent of 
the term by ostension). However, a possible objection can be given as 
following: The sentence (1) expresses different propositions with respect 
to different times such as t and now only because there is a shift in the 
context of evaluation. Therefore, the reason why we have two different 
propositions is because of a shift in the context of evaluation, not be-
cause of the term’s inostensibility. As a reply, we may say: it is true that 
there is a change in the context of evaluation of (1) with respect to these 
different times but this does not imply that two different propositions 
6 There is no consensus among philosophers on what general terms designate. 
Marti (2004) opposes the orthodox view that rigid general terms expresses essential 
properties. For some, in different worlds a general term may have different 
extensions as its designation, which puts a question mark on their rigidity. Some 
others like Inan (2008) take the extension of a kind term to be an abstract entity 
which is independent of its particular objects, thus, he fi nds enough room to hold 
their rigidity safe. But this view too is controversial for it renders almost all general 
terms rigid and leads to an open-ended discussion that cannot take place in this 
paper. For that reason, I leave these issues aside. Cf. Inan (2008), Salmon (2005), 
Marti (2003, 2004), Lewis (1986), Soames (2002), Devitt (2005), Burge (2010).
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are not brought about due to the term’s inostensibility. To show this, we 
can modify the case by keeping the context of evaluation same and ar-
rive at the same conclusions. Suppose, upon reading some articles about 
the element, not Ramsey, but someone else in today’s world, who does 
not have any knowledge about science or chemistry, fi xes the referent of 
the term ‘helium’ by the description “the element causing the D-3 line 
at t”. Given Inan’s characterization of inostensibility, the name ‘helium’ 
is an inostensible term for that person. The name must be inostensible 
for him for it is introduced by an inostensible description. Given also the 
ignorance of this person about to what the element the term refers, he 
is not in a position to fi x the extension of the term by ostension, thus; he 
must solely rely on the initial reference-fi xing description. Although the 
sentence “helium is the element causing the D-3 line at t” expresses a 
contingent truth, the falsity of (1) is due to the modal force of the opera-
tor. Given this modal force, it appears that it cannot be discovered that 
helium did not cause the D-3 line at t. The modal force of the operator is 
from one’s epistemic condition which determines the term’s inostensibil-
ity. One knows that there is a specifi c kind which has some property, 
and one knows this fact because of the fact that the description’s unique-
ly individuation function picks out the kind through which one comes 
to know that it exist. Therefore, the sentence (1) has to express a false 
proposition if the term is inostensible for that person. Suppose further 
that after some time, this person decides to study chemistry and has suf-
fi cient acquaintance with the chemical substance. And now the term be-
comes adequately ostensible for him in such a way that his initial refer-
ence-fi xing-description becomes no longer signifi cant for he could fi x the 
extension of the term by mere ostension now. After all, this person can 
conceive that the element that caused the D-3 line at t was not the same 
element he later is acquainted with since the term becomes adequately 
ostensible for him. Therefore, (1) has to express a true proposition when 
the term becomes ostensible for that person. So from the perspective of 
the ignorant person who fi xes the referent of the term ‘helium’ by that 
description, (1) is false, but from our perspective, it is true, though the 
context of evaluation is the same. Inan notes that Brueckner mentions 
a possible objection to this argument. Brueckner suggested that there is 
still a difference in the context of evaluation, since certain facts about 
the idiolect of the ignorant person who fi xes the referent of the term ‘he-
lium’ differ from the experienced or the epistemically improved one. But 
as Inan replies, “normally the context of evaluation of a sentence such 
as (1) should not include facts about someone’s idiolect” and continues 
that even if we accept such an inclusion, the intuitive conclusion we may 
drive from it supports our claim because “it shows that the truth value 
of the sentence is sensitive to whether the name is ostensible or inosten-
sible for the evaluator” (Inan 1997: 51, fn.18).
Now let us turn to the case of Neptune and suppose Leverrier in-
troduced the name ‘Neptune’ with the defi nite description “the planet 
causing the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus”.
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(2) Neptune is the planet causing the perturbations in the orbit of 
Uranus
Given that reference fi xing ceremony via a linguistic stipulation, 
for Kripke (1980), Leverrier could know the truth of the sentence (2) a 
priori just as the reference fi xer of the standard meter in Paris could 
know that the length of S at t is one meter a priori. Since Leverrier 
knows a priori the contingent truth, (2) expresses a true proposition. 
Before the empirical discovery of Neptune and after the reference fi x-
ing ceremony, Leverrier could intelligibly utter: “I know that Neptune 
is the planet causing the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus”. For 
Kripke, why the sentence (2) express a contingent truth is because of 
the fact that the defi nite description as the predicate term is not a rigid 
designator whereas the subject term ‘Neptune’ is (Kripke 1980: 55). 
The reference-fi xing-description picks out an accidental property such 
as being the planet causing the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus 
for the referent of the name ‘Neptune’. Hence, in some possible worlds 
in which Neptune, Uranus and Earth exist, Neptune can be the planet 
causing the perturbations in the orbit of Earth, not of Uranus. But in 
all possible worlds in which Neptune exists ‘Neptune’ refers to Nep-
tune.7
Now consider the following sentences given by Inan (1997, 2012):
(4) It is discoverable that Neptune is not the planet causing the per-
turbations in the orbit of Uranus.
(5) It is certain that if Neptune exists, then it is the planet causing 
the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus.
Before its empirical discovery, the name ‘Neptune’ was an inosten-
sible term for Leverrier. After the discovery, he could fi x the referent 
of the name by ostension. The context of evaluation of the sentences 
(4) and (5) should again be taken from the perspective of Leverrier. If 
so, we see that Leverrier’s rational responses to the question “What 
do you think about the truth of those sentences?” would drastically 
change with respect to the term’s inostensibility for him. Hence; (4) 
is obviously false but (5) is true if the term ‘Neptune’ is inostensible 
for Leverrier as the reference fi xer. One may argue that if the modal 
force applied by the operator is taken as metaphysical, then the term’s 
inostensibility should not have any bearing on what proposition is ex-
pressed. I think this intuition is right but in our case the modal force 
embedded in the operator should be taken as epistemic. For instance, 
if we are asked whether it is possible that 521 is not a prime number, 
then we, in principle, may answer that “Yes, it is possible that it is not 
a prime number”, provided that we have no knowledge as to whether 
7 Suppose a neutron star is approaching to the solar system. Eventually by the 
force of the gravitational fi eld of the star, the state of the orbits of the heavenly 
bodies in the solar system can break down in such a way in which Neptune for some 
time will be the planet causing the perturbations in the orbit of Earth, not of Uranus. 
Thus, this is not just metaphysically but also physically possible scenario.
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521 is a prime. Lack of de re knowledge about the number affects the 
modal force applied on the proposition. But in the metaphysical sense, 
521, the 98th prime number, must be a prime number. So, we will have 
an epistemic reading of the sentence in mind. Why (4) is false when the 
term is inostensible for Leverrier is not only because it is not possible 
(given epistemic modality) that after Leverrier fi xes the reference of 
the name, he fi nds out that Neptune was never the cause of the per-
turbations but also because it would contradict with what Leverrier 
knows a priori. It just seems absurd to claim that by a description one 
can name an object which is known to exist as having a certain prop-
erty through which he identifi es the existence of the object with that 
description and at the same time one fi nds out that the description does 
not fi t the object in question. Another reason for why (4) is false and 
(5) is true when the term is inostensible for Leverrier is because the 
propositions constructed by the reference fi xing ceremony via an act of 
linguistic stipulation are non-informative and indubitable for the refer-
ence fi xer. For Inan, the reason why the sentences expressing non-triv-
ial propositions that are contingently true cannot be the object of doubt 
for Leverrier is that such sentences are non-informative and indubi-
table for him (Inan 2012: 170). Besides all, in its de re context Leverrier 
knows a priori that there is a specifi c object and that it is the planet 
causing the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus. Inan maintains that 
in the reference-fi xing cases the speaker is not under normal condi-
tions.8 When Leverrier fi xes the reference of the name ‘Neptune’ by 
its reference-fi xing-description and later forms the sentence “Neptune 
is the planet causing the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus”, in the 
mind of Leverrier there is no prior fi le of the object, which allows him 
to evaluate the truth of the sentences (4) and (5) different from when 
he is under normal conditions. On the other hand the sentence (4) is 
true but (5) is false if the term ‘Neptune’ is ostensible for Leverrier. The 
reason why the sentence (4) is true and (5) is false now is because after 
the empirical discovery of Neptune and consequently after the term 
becomes ostensible for Leverrier, his initial reference fi xing would no 
longer be signifi cant for him given that (due to the non-rigidity of the 
description) it could have been the case that the uniquely individuation 
function of the reference-fi xing description of the term ‘Neptune’ picks 
out a different object who has the accidental quality. One may object 
to our account in the following way: It would not be a big surprise that 
an epistemic distinction may have a bearing on what proposition ex-
pressed by a sentence whose content includes an epistemic operator. 
It would be vacuously true to say that an epistemic distinction applied 
on a certain term occurring in a certain sentence with an epistemic 
operator must have a bearing on what proposition is expressed by that 
8 According to Inan, if S acquires a name “N” and then later learns that N is F, 
then S is under normal conditions with respect to the sentence “N is F” (Inan: 2012: 
172).
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sentence if the term on which the distinction is applied is in the scope of 
the operator. However, this objection cannot undermine our claim since 
we would explain nothing about the fact that makes the meaning of the 
sentence, not only of the operator susceptible to the given distinction. 
Strictly speaking, if a term on which an epistemic distinction is applied 
is in the scope of a certain epistemic operator in a given sentence and 
if there are cases in which that epistemic distinction applied on that 
term occurring in that given sentence with that operator has a bearing 
on what proposition is expressed by that sentence, then we must agree 
that meaning of that sentence depends upon that distinction, however 
trivial it seems. The triviality requires its own account of explanation, 
which is a work that ought to be done in another paper.
3. Conclusion
I argued that there are some certain intensional contexts such as the 
sentences with certain epistemic operators, where the epistemic dis-
tance of the speaker from the object to which the speaker inostensi-
bly refers might be the thing that is responsible for the change in the 
meaning of the concepts or the thoughts about those objects. Thus, the 
distinction based on the epistemic condition of the speaker as the ref-
erence fi xer has a semantic signifi cance in some certain intensional 
contexts. What does this picture tell us? What kind of philosophical 
consequences may we drive from the thesis that in certain contexts, 
subjects’ epistemic condition has a bearing on the meaning of certain 
sentences? What implications of these consequences can we also derive 
from this picture to have an idea about why in these reference-fi xing 
cases, epistemic condition of subjects does have a bearing on the se-
mantic content of certain propositions and why in most other cases 
does not? I will leave the possible answers of these questions aside for 
another and perhaps a more detailed discussion.
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